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I n summer 2016, the eyes of the world will turn to Rio de Janeiro as it hosts the Games of the XXXI Olympiad, better known as the Summer Olympics. Unfortunately, the price tag of well over $10 billion for the event is adding to 
the already considerable strain on government budgets in Brazil. Faced with a nasty 
recession, cuts in public services, and rising unemployment, throngs of Brazilians 
have turned out to protest what is seen as wasteful spending and a misallocation of 
resources on the Olympics. Throw in the growing threat of the Zika virus and Brazil 
may end up with larger crowds of agitators protesting the government than of sports 
fans cheering on the athletes. But are these complaints about Olympic spending 
justified? The quadrennial Summer Olympic Games is one of the world’s premier 
sporting events, with over 10,000 athletes representing 204 countries, 300  indi-
vidual events in 28 different sports, over 10 million tickets sold to spectators, and 
a worldwide television audience in the billions. On a somewhat smaller scale, the 
most recent Winter Olympic Games held in 2014 in Sochi, Russia, welcomed nearly 
3,000 athletes from 88 countries to compete in 98 events in 15 disciplines while 
generating large revenues and massive television ratings.
While most viewers tune in to watch the competition among the athletes, the 
battle among cities to be selected to host these events can be just as fierce. Although 
bidding cities have numerous reasons for wanting to host, none seems more preva-
lent than the desire for an economic windfall. In this paper, we explore the costs and 
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benefits of hosting the Olympic Games. On the cost side, there are three major cate-
gories: general infrastructure such as transportation and housing to accommodate 
athletes and fans; specific sports infrastructure required for competition venues; 
and operational costs, including general administration as well as the opening and 
closing ceremony and security. Three major categories of benefits also exist: the 
short-run benefits of tourist spending during the Games; the long-run benefits or 
the “Olympic legacy” which might include improvements in infrastructure and 
increased trade, foreign investment, or tourism after the Games; and intangible 
benefits such as the “feel-good effect” or civic pride.
Each of these costs and benefits will be addressed in turn, but the overwhelming 
conclusion is that in most cases the Olympics are a money-losing proposition for host 
cities; they result in positive net benefits only under very specific and unusual circum-
stances. Furthermore, the cost–benefit proposition is worse for cities in developing 
countries than for those in the industrialized world. In closing, we discuss why what 
looks like an increasingly poor investment decision on the part of cities still receives 
significant bidding interest and whether changes in the bidding process of the Inter-
national Olympic Committee (IOC) will improve outcomes for potential hosts.
The Costs of Hosting the Olympics
The modern Summer Olympic Games date back to 1896, and the Winter 
Games commenced in 1924. The host cities are selected roughly seven years before 
the event through an open-bidding process. The host cities are responsible for the 
entire bill for organizing the event, although the International Olympic Committee 
typically provides some funds to help defray the costs. Historically, host cities have 
come almost exclusively from rich, industrialized nations. Between 1896 and 1998, 
over 90 percent of all host cities came from Western Europe, the United States, or 
Canada, Australia, and Japan. Only Mexico City, Moscow, and Seoul—hosts of the 
1968, 1980, and 1988 Summer Games, respectively—and Sarajevo, host of the 1984 
Winter Games, bucked this trend.
More recently, the International Olympic Committee has encouraged bids 
from developing countries and has awarded the games on multiple occasions to 
cities outside the regions that had traditionally served as hosts. The 2008 Summer 
Games were hosted by Beijing, China, which will in turn host the Winter Olympics 
in 2022. The 2016 Summer Olympics will be held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the first 
time the event has taken place in South America. The 2014 Winter Olympics were 
in Sochi, Russia, with PyeongChang, South Korea, to follow in 2018.
As seen in Table 1, the composition of countries submitting formal bids has also 
changed dramatically in recent decades. Only 18 percent of the bids submitted for 
the Summer Games prior to 2000 came from the developing world or the former 
Soviet sphere of influence. Since that time, however, over half of all bids have come 
from this group, including applications by Istanbul, Bangkok, Havana, Doha, and 
Cape Town, as well as the successful bids from Beijing and Rio de Janiero. For 
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the Winter Olympics, the past decade has witnessed for the first time bids from 
Kazakhstan, Georgia, China, Slovakia, and Poland.
Bidding for the Olympics is no small undertaking. A key to the bidding process 
involves a visit by the Evaluation Commission of the International Olympic Committee 
which assesses the condition of the applicant city. A significant portion of the bidding 
expense relates to the preparations the applicant city undertakes to impress the Eval-
uation Commission, and these plans, including detailed architectural renderings, 
financial estimates, and pre-event marketing, are likely to be extensive since it cannot 
be known what the preparations of the other applicant cities will be. Chicago, for 
example, spent at least $70 million and perhaps over $100 million on its unsuccessful 
application to host the 2016 Games (Pletz 2010; Zimbalist 2015). But the costs of the 
formal bidding process pale in comparison to the expenses a region will incur should 
it actually be selected by the International Olympic Committee.
A first set of major expenses involves general infrastructure to accommodate the 
anticipated wave of tourists and athletes that descend upon the chosen city. The Inter-
national Olympic Committee requires that the host city for the Summer Games have 
a minimum of 40,000 hotel rooms available for spectators and an Olympic Village 
capable of housing 15,000 athletes and officials. In addition, the city needs to have 
both internal and external transportation facilities that can get tourists to the city itself 
and then to the individual sports venues within the region. Hotel capacity alone can 
be a major challenge. Rio de Janeiro, already one of the most popular tourist destina-
tions in South America, still required the construction of over 15,000 new hotel rooms 
for the 2016 Summer Games. While investment in the hospitality industry can in 
theory pay long-term dividends once the Games are over, heavy expenditures to meet 
a two-week period of peak demand may result in severe overcapacity once the event 
is over. For example, following the 1994 Winter Olympics in Lillehammer, Norway, 
40 percent of the town’s full-service hotels went bankrupt (Teiglund 1999).
The Olympics also require spending on specialized sports infrastructure. 
Because of the somewhat obscure nature of many of the events, most cities do not 
Table 1 
Number of Bids for Summer and Winter Olympic Games 
Bidders Hosts
Event
Industrialized 
countries
Developing 
countries
Eastern 
European/ 
Former  
Soviet states
Industrialized 
countries
Developing 
countries
Eastern 
European/ 
Former  
Soviet states
Summer Olympics:
 1896–1996 71 (82%) 9 (10%) 7 (8%) 20 (87%) 2 (9%) 1 (4%)
 2000–2020 23 (49%) 21 (44%) 4 (7%) 4 (67%) 2 (33%) 0 (0%)
Winter Olympics:
 1924–1998 51 (93%) 1 (2%) 3 (5%) 17 (94%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%)
 2002–2022 21 (56%) 4 (9%) 12 (34%) 4 (67%) 1 (17%) 1 (17%)
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have the facilities in place to host all of the competitions, especially if large spectator 
viewing areas are desired. Even modern cities in high-income countries may need to 
build or expand an existing velodrome, natatorium, ski-jumping complex, or speed 
skating oval. Furthermore, modern football and soccer stadiums are generally 
incompatible with a full-size Olympic track, because including space for such a track 
would cause an undesirably large separation between the fans and the playing field. 
For this reason, Boston’s failed bid to host the 2024 Summer Games had proposed 
$400 million to build an entirely new stadium for the track and field events, despite 
the presence of four large existing outdoor sports stadiums in the area.
Once the facilities are in place, the Games require spending for operations 
including event management, the opening and closing ceremonies, and security. 
The Olympics have long been a target for terrorists and have suffered deadly attacks 
in both 1972 in Munich and 1996 in Atlanta. In the era of post-September 11, 2001, 
security costs have escalated rapidly. Security costs for Sydney’s Games in 2000 
totaled $250 million, while four years later in Athens, security expenditures topped 
$1.6 billion, four times the initial budget, and have stayed near this figure for the 
past decade (Matheson 2013).
An accurate financial accounting of Olympic expenditures in various cities is hard 
to find for multiple reasons. It can be difficult to disentangle spending on Olympic 
building projects from planned infrastructure improvements that might not be attrib-
utable directly to the games. Moreover, concerns about cost overruns or corruption 
may prompt officials to limit the release of accurate data. The true final cost of the 
1998 Nagano Winter Olympics will never be known, because the host committee 
ordered a portion of the event’s financial records to be burned (Jordan and Sullivan 
1999). While we keep these concerns in mind, Table 2 shows some cost estimates for 
recent Olympic Games as provided by the International Olympic Committee, host 
committees, and various academic or public media sources with spending on sports 
infrastructure and general infrastructure broken out where possible.
Finally, it is important to note the Olympics have consistently produced final 
costs that exceeded their original budgets. From 1968 to 2012, every single Olympic 
Games ended up costing more than originally estimated. The median Games were 
150 percent over the original budget, with the worst offenders—Montreal 1976 and 
Sarajevo 1984—exceeding initial estimates by more than ten-fold (Flyvbjerg and 
Stewart 2012). The 2012 London organizers originally won the bid in 2005 with a cost 
estimate of £2.4 billion, which was revised upwards within two years to £9.3 billion. 
Then, when the final costs came in at a mere £8.77 billion, the organizers laughably 
claimed the event had come in under budget (BBC 2013).
The Short-Run Benefits of Hosting the Olympics
Although the costs of hosting can be daunting, the local Organizing Committees 
for the Olympic Games point to both a short-run boost from the construction phase 
preceding the event as well as tourism bumps during the Games and the long-run 
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legacy effect of the Games as an economic justification for hosting these events. In 
addition, the Olympics do generate significant sponsor, ticketing, licensing, and 
media revenues that can be used to offset the costs of staging the event.
Table 3 shows data on revenues generated by the International Olympic 
Committee and the organizing committees for the Vancouver and London 
Games from the most recent IOC four-year budget cycle. In theory, the revenues 
generated from the Games can be divvied up any way the organizers see fit, but 
ultimately the IOC exercises complete control over the event and can share as 
much or as little of largesse as they deem fit subject to the constraint of finding 
Table 2 
Costs of Hosting Recent Olympic Games
Type of spending 
Spending 
(billions, 2015$) Source
Summer Olympics
 Seoul, 1988 Sports infrastructure
General infrastructure
Total cost
$2.067
$3.523
$ 6.503
Preuss (2004, Table 7.8 
 and Figure 9.1)
 Barcelona, 1992 Sports infrastructure
General infrastructure
Total cost
$1.485
$12.457
$16.409 
Preuss (2004)
 Atlanta, 1996 Sports infrastructure
General infrastructure
Total cost
$.765
$.959
$3.576
Preuss (2004)
 Sydney, 2000 Sports infrastructure
General infrastructure
Total cost
$1.761 
$1.817
$6.926
Preuss (2004)
 Athens, 2004 Total cost $13.800 (est.) Tagaris (2014)
 Beijing, 2008 Sports infrastructure
Total cost (est.)
$2.315
$45.000 (est.)
Preuss (2004)
Fowler and Meichtry  
 (2008)
 London, 2012 Total cost $11.401 BBC (2012b)
 Rio 2016 Total cost $11.100 (est.) Leme (2015)
Winter Olympics
 Nagano, 1998 Total cost $15.250 Longman (1998); The  
 Economist (1998)
 Salt Lake City, 2002 Total cost $2.500 (approx.) US GAO (2001)
 Torino, 2006 Total cost $4.350 (approx.) Payne (2008); Flyvbjerg 
 and Stewart (2012)
 Vancouver, 2010 Sports infrastructure
General infrastructure
Total cost
$.715
$3.497
$7.556
VanWynsberghe (2011)
 Sochi, 2014 Sports infrastructure
Total cost
$6.700 (est.)
$51.000 (est.)
Farhi (2014) 
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a city willing to host the event. Most recently, television rights have represented 
nearly half of total revenues with the IOC sharing less than 30 percent of the total 
with the local Organizing Committees. Revenues from international sponsors are 
split between the International Olympic Committee and the Organizing Commit-
tees, while ticket revenue, domestic sponsorships, and licensing fees are kept by 
the host city. Obviously, the IOC could provide more generous subsidies to cities 
in order to defray the costs of hosting their tournaments, and international sports 
governing bodies, including the IOC, are often known for their lavish expenses. 
However, in the case of the London and Vancouver Games, the direct revenues 
generated by the games represented only a fraction of the total costs of hosting 
the event and would not have come close to covering the total costs even if the 
IOC had committed all revenue streams to the host committees, so one must rely 
on other sources of benefits to provide an economic justification for the events.
Any large public works project such as the Olympics can lead to a short-run 
increase in economic activity in the run-up to the opening, depending on the level 
of slack in a region’s labor and capital markets, and act as a form of an expansionary 
fiscal policy. It is perhaps telling to note that at the same time David Cameron’s govern-
ment in the United Kingdom was promoting the supposed expansionary effects of 
fiscal austerity in the wake of the Great Recession, the same government was touting 
the stimulative effects of increased government spending on London’s Olympic 
preparations (Mullholland 2012). However, unless policymakers can predict reces-
sions years ahead of time—given that the International Olympic Committee awards 
the Games seven years in advance—using the Olympics to pull a country out of 
recession would rest more on dumb luck rather than prudent planning. Otherwise, 
Table 3 
Direct Revenues and Hosting Costs from Olympic Games  
($ millions)
IOC 2009–12
Vancouver 2010
organizing 
committee
London 2012
organizing  
committee
Revenue source
 Broadcast rights $2,723 $414 $713
 International sponsors $475 $175 (est.) $300 (est.)
 Domestic sponsors $0 $688 $1,150
 Ticketing $0 $250 $988
 Licensing $0 $51 $119
 Total $3,198 $1,578 $3,270
Hosting costs - $7,556 $11,401
Source: IOC (2014b).
Notes: Table 3 shows data on revenues generated by the International Olympic 
Committee and the organizing committees for the Vancouver and London Games over 
the 2009–2012, the most recent IOC budget cycle. It also shows hosting costs for the 
Vancouver and London Games.
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the spending involved with the Games is as likely to redistribute spending in an 
economy near full employment as it is to lift an economy out of recession. Indeed, 
unless unemployment is high, employment gains in construction are not an impor-
tant economic benefit since they come at the cost of employment losses in other 
industries.
That being said, various economic impact studies done in advance of the 
Olympic Games have often produced large estimates of economic gains. An 
InterVISTAS Consulting (2002) report on the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics 
predicted $10.7 billion (Canadian) in new economic output and 244,000 jobs 
compared to $4.8 billion (in 2002 dollars) and 35,000 job-years predicted in Salt 
Lake City eight years earlier by the state government of Utah (IOC 2010). The 
1996 Atlanta Games were predicted to generate 77,026 jobs and $5.142 billion 
(in 1996 dollars) in economic activity, while the London Olympics promised 
£1.936 billion in economic activity and an additional 8,164 full-time equivalent jobs 
created (Humphreys and Plummer 1995; Blake 2005).
The variation alone in these estimates suggests some reason for concern about 
their accuracy; indeed, these before-the-Games predictions are rarely matched by 
reality when economists look back at the data. Table 4 shows academic studies 
of various Olympic Games. Overwhelmingly, the studies show actual economic 
impacts that are either near-zero or a fraction of that predicted prior to the event. 
Nearly all of the analyses follow the same pattern. Researchers collect any type 
of regional economic data that is readily available such as employment, personal 
income, GDP, tax collections, or tourism figures, and then analyze the data before, 
during, and after the Olympics in search of any changes that occur either during 
the event or in the preparation stages. The observed changes in economic vari-
ables are then compared to the predictions made by the Olympic organizers prior 
to the event.
For example, as noted previously, the Utah state government predicted the 
2002 Winter Olympics would generate 35,000 job-years, concentrated primarily in 
the year of the event itself. Baumann, Engelhardt, and Matheson (2012) examine 
monthly employment overall as well as in a variety of specific industries such as 
retail trade and leisure between 1990 and 2009 in Utah using employment in several 
adjacent states to control for regional employment trends around the time of the 
Olympics. They find no identifiable increase in employment either before or after 
the Olympics, and while they find a statistically significant bump in employment 
during the actual Games, the increase was 4,000 to 7,000 jobs, or roughly one-quarter 
to one-tenth the number claimed by Utah officials. Considering that the federal 
government spent $342 million directly on the 2002 Olympics and at least another 
$1.1 billion on infrastructure improvements leading up the Games, this amounts 
to about $300,000 in federal government spending per job created. Other studies 
listed in Table 4 find similar outcomes. Indeed, these results lend credence to a 
common rule-of-thumb often used by economists who study mega-events: If one 
wishes to know the true economic impact of an event, take whatever numbers the 
promoters are touting and move the decimal point one place to the left.
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These results beg the question: Why do before-the-Games economic impact 
studies rarely stand up to after-the-Games scrutiny? One obvious answer is that 
economic impact studies are often commissioned by groups who have a vested 
interest in their outcome, and these groups choose firms that are likely to produce a 
favorable result. Estimates can be easily manipulated by making unrealistic assump-
tions about costs and benefits. The resulting claim of a large economic windfall may 
be used to curry public favor or to justify a large taxpayer subsidy.
Even when a highly positive estimate of Olympic benefits is not the explicit goal 
of an economic impact study, the methodology used in most studies is flawed in a 
way that biases the economic impact upwards. First, economic impact studies often 
ignore the “substitution effect” that occurs when local residents shift their spending 
from other goods in the local economy to the Olympics. If the study counts the 
purchase of a ticket by a local resident to an Olympic event without accounting 
for what would have been purchased in the absence of the Games, the impact of 
the Olympics will be overstated. For this reason, economists studying the effect 
Table 4 
Academic Studies of the Economic Impact of the Olympic Games
Study Event Results
Baade and Matheson (2002) 1984 Summer Games  
 (Los Angeles) and 1996  
 Summer Games (Atlanta)
5,043 new jobs in Los Angeles.  
 Between 3,467 and 42,448 new  
 jobs in Atlanta.
Jasmand and Maennig (2008) 1972 Summer Games  
 (Munich)
No impact on employment in host  
 regions. Positive impact on  
 income.
Porter and Fletcher (2008) 1996 Summer Games  
 (Atlanta) and 2002 Winter  
 Games (Salt Lake City)
No impact on taxable sales, hotel  
 occupancy, or airport usage.  
 Significant increase in hotel prices.
Baade, Baumann, and  
 Matheson (2010)
2002 Winter Games  
 (Salt Lake City)
Taxable sales in restaurants and  
 hotels up by $70.6 million but  
 taxable sales at general  
 merchandisers down by  
 $167.4 million.
Giesecke and Madden (2011) 2000 Summer Games  
 (Sydney)
Household consumption in Australia  
 reduced by $2.1 billion.
Baumann, Engelhardt, and  
 Matheson (2012)
2002 Winter Games  
 (Salt Lake City)
Increase in employment of  
 4,000–7,000 jobs for one year  
 compared to predictions of  
 35,000 full-time equivalent job-years.
Hotchkiss, Moore, and Zobay  
 (2003)
1996 Summer Games  
 (Atlanta)
Increase in employment of  
 293,000 jobs. Increase in  
 employment growth rate by 0.2%.
Feddersen and Maennig  
 (2013)
1996 Summer Games  
 (Atlanta)
29,000 jobs added during month of  
 Olympics only.
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of sporting events on local economies often advocate eliminating expenditures by 
local residents entirely.
Second, the “crowding out effect” occurs when the crowds and congestion asso-
ciated with a mega-event dissuades other regular tourists or business travelers from 
visiting the host region. Even when the number of out-of-town Olympics spectators 
is large, hotel rooms in the host city may normally be nearly full so that the net 
increase in visitor arrivals to the region is likely to be much smaller and perhaps 
even negative. For example, the UK Office for National Statistics (2015) reported 
that the number of international visitors to the country fell to 6,174,000 visitors in 
July and August 2012, the months of the Olympics, from 6,568,000 the year before, 
and some popular shows in London’s theater district actually shut down during 
the Games. Similarly, Beijing reported a 30 percent drop in international visitors 
and a 39 percent drop in hotel occupancy during the month of the 2008 Games 
compared to the previous year. Utah ski resorts noted a 9.9 percent fall in skier days 
in the 2001–02 season during which the Salt Lake City Winter Games occurred, 
compared to the previous year along with a drop in taxable sales collections at these 
locations (Zimbalist 2015; Baade, Baumann, and Matheson 2010). Taxable sales 
and skier visits rebounded the following season, after the departure of the Olympic 
fans and athletes. Other host cities that have experienced an increase in visitors 
during the Olympics still routinely report net increases in tourism that are signifi-
cantly below expectations—and typically lower than the number of identified ticket 
buyers. American baseball player Yogi Berra’s famous quip, “Nobody goes there 
anymore. It’s too crowded,” may apply here.
The third main failing of standard before-the-fact economic impact analysis is 
the problem of choosing an appropriate multiplier for expenditures. Clearly some 
level of tourist spending will recirculate in the economy as local businesses and 
workers re-spend a portion of any Olympic windfall that comes their way. At a very 
basic level, standard macroeconomic analysis suggests that the expenditure multi-
plier will be
ΔY/Δspending = ΔY/Olympic spending = 1/(1 − marginal propensity to consume),
so that a $1 increase in spending due to the Olympics will result in 1/(1 − MPC) 
extra dollars in total output for the host city. While every city and industry is different, 
it is common to see multipliers of roughly 2 applied to visitor spending, so that an 
initial increase in direct spending leads to a similar level of indirect spending and a 
doubling of the total economic impact.
Several tools can be used to potentially produce more precise economic impact 
estimates including the Regional Input-Output Multiplier System (RIMS II) provided 
by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis and IMpact for PLANning (IMPLAN), a 
commercially available software package. Both models use input-output tables for 
specific industries grounded in interindustry relationships within regions based 
upon an economic area’s normal production patterns. But as Matheson (2009) 
notes: “During an event like the Olympics, however, the economy within a region 
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may be anything but normal, and therefore, these same inter-industry relationships 
may not hold. Since there is no reason to believe that the usual economic multi-
pliers are the same during mega-events, any economic analyses based upon these 
multipliers may, therefore, be highly inaccurate.”
The hotel industry offers case in point. Even critics of the Olympics like Porter 
and Fletcher (2008) concede that the Olympics typically cause a substantial increase 
in room rates. The wages paid to a hotel’s desk clerks and room cleaners, however, are 
likely to remain roughly unchanged. As a hotel’s revenue increases without a corre-
sponding increase in labor costs, the return to capital rises while the return to labor 
falls as a percent of revenues. To the extent that hotels (as well as chain restaurants, 
car rental agencies, airlines, and similar firms) are nationally or internationally owned, 
this increase in corporate profits doesn’t stick in the host city but instead leaves the 
area in which the profits were earned. In effect, due to these increased leakages, 
the MPC in the host city falls, thus reducing the multiplier effect during mega-events.
Replacing input-output models with computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models that account for capacity constraints, displacement, expenditure shifting, 
price changes, and changing economic conditions can lead to improved estimates 
for the economic impact of the Olympics, although the use of these models is a much 
more difficult undertaking. As one example, Giesecke and Madden (2011) carried 
out a retrospective examination of the 2000 Sydney Olympics using a CGE model. 
They found a reduction in total consumption for Australia of $2.1 billion; in contrast, 
before-the-Games estimates that didn’t account for the degree of slack in labor 
markets and assumed no displacement of international tourism predicted increases 
in consumption of $2.5 billion over the same period.
While spending directly associated with the Olympics is typically insufficient 
to cover the costs of staging the Games, short-run intangible benefits must also 
be considered. Host cities frequently experience a “feel-good effect” both in the 
run-up to and in the wake of mega-events. For example, 80 percent of respondents 
surveyed by the BBC (2012) immediately after the 2012 Olympics reported that 
the event “made them more proud to be British.” Several studies have attempted 
to quantify the intangible benefits of the Olympics through the use of contingent 
valuation methodology, which constructs a set of survey questions that are designed 
to elicit the monetary value people place on whether certain events occur or do not 
occur. Using this approach, both Atkinson, Mourato, Szymanski, and Ozdemiroglu 
(2008) and Walton, Longo, and Dawson (2008) undertook sophisticated contingent 
valuation surveys using best practices for the 2012 London Olympics and found that 
persons both within London and throughout the United Kingdom expressed a will-
ingness to pay to host the Games over and above any costs associated with actually 
attending any of the events. The total intangible value identified to UK residents in 
the studies was approximately £2 billion (or roughly $3.4 billion at the exchange 
rates at the time of the study). This amount is clearly substantial, but it is well below 
the cost of hosting the Games.
Given the expenses associated with specialized venues and event opera-
tions, especially security, it is difficult for the revenues directly generated by the 
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Olympics or the surrounding tourism to cover the cost of the event. Allowing for a 
“feel-good effect” doesn’t close the gap, either. Thus, an economic justification for 
the Olympics must rest on including additional benefits from the long-run legacy 
of the Games.
The Long-Run Benefits of Hosting the Olympics
The arguments that the Olympics bring long-term benefits fall into several cate-
gories. First, the Games might leave a legacy of sporting facilities that can be used 
by future generations. Second, investments in general infrastructure can provide 
long-run returns and improve the livability of host cities. Third, the media attention 
surrounding the Games can serve as an advertising campaign that serves to promote 
the area as a destination for future tourism. Finally, the Olympics can promote foreign 
direct investment and increased international trade, as the Olympics causes investors 
and companies worldwide to become familiar with the area.
A positive legacy of sporting facilities is the least promising of these claims. 
Academic studies of sports facilities on host communities are nearly unanimous in 
finding little or no economic benefits associated with stadiums and arenas (Coates 
and Humphreys 2008). Furthermore, due to the nature of the sporting events spon-
sored by the Olympics, host cities are often left with specialized sports infrastructure 
that has little use beyond the Games, so that in addition to the initial construction 
costs, cities may be faced with heavy long-term expenses for the maintenance of 
“white elephants.” Many of the venues from the Athens Games in 2004 have fallen 
into disrepair. Beijing’s iconic “Bird’s Nest” Stadium has rarely been used since 2008 
and has been partially converted into apartments, while the swimming facility next 
door dubbed the “Water Cube” was repurposed as an indoor water park at a cost 
exceeding $50 million (Farrar 2010). The Stadium at Queen Elizabeth Olympic 
Park in London, the site for most of the track and field events as well as the opening 
and closing ceremonies in 2012, was designed to be converted into a soccer stadium 
for local club West Ham United in order to avoid the “white elephant” problem. 
Before the Games, the stadium had an original price tag of £280 million. Cost over-
runs led to a final construction cost of £429 million, and then the conversion cost to 
remove the track and prepare the facility to accommodate soccer matches topped 
£272 million, of which the local club is paying only £15 million (Sky Sports 2015).
General infrastructure improvements clearly have the potential for better 
returns. The athletes’ villages in both Atlanta and Los Angeles were converted into 
new dormitories for local universities in their respective cities, and Utah wound up 
with expanded highways between its major population center in Salt Lake City and 
the popular ski resorts in the mountains to its east. But here, too, a caveat is in order. 
It is often argued that the Olympics can serve as a catalyst for urban redevelopment 
and to generate the political will required to undertake needed infrastructure invest-
ments. However, there is no reason to believe that the investments required to host 
the Olympics will provide higher returns than alternative infrastructure projects that 
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could have been carried out instead. Also, while the firm deadlines provided by the 
Olympics may constrain cities to follow projects through to timely completion, 
the same deadlines may raise costs due to time pressures and labor constraints.
The Olympics can serve to “put a city on the map” as a tourist destination. In 
1990, Barcelona was the 13th most popular tourist destination in Europe with fewer 
than half the number of bed nights as its neighboring rival, Madrid. Following the 
1992 Summer Olympics that also highlighted many nonsports venues in the region, 
the city experienced the fastest growth in tourism among large European cities, so 
that by 2010 the city was the fifth most popular destination on the continent and 
had eclipsed Madrid in bed nights (Zimbalist 2015). Similarly, ski resorts in Utah 
experienced a 20.4 percent increase in skier visits between the year before the Salt 
Lake City Games in 2000–01 and 2014–15, outpacing Colorado’s 8.0 percent growth 
over the same period.
However, the results in Salt Lake City and Barcelona have not been replicated 
in other host cities. The explanation for their success may be that both of these 
locations can be seen as “hidden gems,” locations that are highly attractive to tour-
ists but that had been previously passed over for their better-known neighbors in 
Colorado and Madrid. This strategy won’t necessarily work for many other poten-
tial host cities. Lillehammer, Norway, the venue for the Winter Games in 1994, 
offered few attractions to tourists outside of the Olympic events and was therefore 
unattractive to tourists after the Games left town. By 1997, the increase in inter-
national guest-nights in Lillehammer was only 8 percent higher than the increase 
in foreign tourism in Norway overall (Tiegland 1999). Similarly, the 1988 Calgary 
Winter Olympics significantly raised international awareness of the city, but without 
a lasting ability to attract tourists, the enhanced image of the city rapidly faded 
(Richie and Smith 1991). Conversely, London, with over 18 million international 
visitors per year, was already the most popular tourist destination in the world prior 
to the 2012 Olympics, and it was never likely that the event would raise its already 
impressive profile. The success of the Olympics in developing a city as a tourist desti-
nation should not be rejected out of hand, but neither is it a surefire way to ensure 
a steady stream of visitors after the closing ceremonies.
A final economic justification for hosting the Olympics is that the Games can 
serve as positive signal to businesses and consumers about the future state of the 
economy. Using regression analysis of time-series panel data, Rose and Spiegel 
(2011) examine exports from 196 countries and territories between 1950 and 2006 
and find that countries that host the Olympics experience an increase in exports of 
over 20 percent. Using a similar methodology, Brückner and Pappa (2015) examine 
consumption, investment, and output data over a similar time frame and range of 
countries and discover that all three measures of economic activity rise significantly 
around the time that the host country makes its initial bid as well as two to five years 
before the event actually takes place. On the surface, these results appear to vindi-
cate the massive expenditures that are routinely incurred when hosting the Games. 
However, the same studies also show that unsuccessfully bidding for the Olympics 
appears to have similar effects on these economic variables.
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There are several possible explanations for these surprising results. Rose and 
Spiegel (2011) suggest that it is not the event itself or the resulting tourism or 
advertising that increases exports, but rather that the very act of bidding serves 
as a credible signal that a country is committing itself to trade liberalization that 
will permanently increase trade flows. Brückner and Pappa (2015) theorize that 
the announcement of a bid for the Olympics represents a news shock predicting 
increases in future government investment.
While signaling and news shocks may be important drivers of modern econo-
mies, it is a bit hard to swallow the claim that the mere act of a single city within a 
country bidding for the right to throw a three-week party seven years in the future 
can result in enormous nationwide increases in trade, investment, and income. 
A more plausible answer is that countries are not randomly chosen to bid for the 
Games, but rather that bidding nations are almost exclusively drawn from a set 
of countries with sound economies and bright prospects for the future—a clear 
case of selection bias. To test for spurious correlation, Maennig and Richter (2012) 
and Langer, Maennig, and Richter (2015) note that when bidding countries are 
appropriately compared with countries that are otherwise similar but did not bid for 
the Games using propensity matching techniques, the significant Olympic effects 
on trade, consumption, investment, and income all disappear. Again, the long-run 
benefits of hosting the Games prove to be elusive.
Why Do Countries Continue To Host?
If the Olympic Games tend to offer only a low chance of providing host cities 
with positive net benefits, why do cities keep lining up to host these events? At least 
three possibilities arise. First, even if the overall effect of holding the Games is typi-
cally negative, large projects will still create winners and losers. Boston’s ultimately 
unsuccessful bid to host the 2024 Summer Games was spearheaded by leaders in the 
heavy construction and hospitality industries, the two sectors of the economy that 
stood the most to gain from the city hosting the Olympics.
Second, economic concerns may only play a small role in a country’s decision 
whether or not to stage the Olympics. The desire to host the Games may be driven 
by the egos of a country’s leaders or as a demonstration of a country’s political and 
economic power. It is difficult to explain Russia’s $51 billion expenditure on the 
2014 Sochi Games or China’s $45 billion investment in the 2008 Beijing Summer 
Olympics otherwise. In countries where the government is not accountable to 
voters or taxpayers, it is quite possible for the government to engage in wasteful 
spending that enriches a small group of private industrialists or government leaders 
without repercussions. In the bidding for the 2022 Winter Olympics, four of the 
cities in liberal western democracies that initially indicated interest in staging 
the Games—Oslo, Stockholm, Krakow, and Munich—withdrew from the bidding 
after local voters expressed opposition to the bids, leaving the International Olympic 
Committee to choose which autocratic regime would hold the event: Beijing, China, 
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or Almaty, Kazakhstan. In the bidding for the 2024 Summer Olympics, both Boston 
and Hamburg withdrew their bids in the face of public opposition.
Finally, it is possible to ascribe a portion of the economic failings of the Olympics 
to the “winner’s curse,” the result in auction theory that when parties are bidding 
on an asset of uncertain value (like rights to offshore oil leasing tracts), the winner 
will tend to be the bidder who is most prone to overestimating the value of the 
asset—which means that the winner is likely to be systematically disappointed (for an 
overview of the “winner’s curse,” see Thaler 1988). The 1970s witnessed a decline in 
enthusiasm among cities willing to host the Games. In 1972, voters in Denver, after 
having been initially awarded the 1976 Winter Olympics, rejected a $5 million bond 
referendum that would have been used to finance the Games, requiring the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee to rescind its offer. Following the financial debacle of the 
1976 Montreal Olympics, by the time it came to award the 1984 Summer Games, Los 
Angeles was the only bidder. Given the resulting bargaining position, the Los Angeles 
Organizing Committee was able to dictate the terms of bid to the International 
Olympic Committee. For example, it insisted on utilizing the area’s existing sports 
infrastructure, including the 60-year old Los Angeles Coliseum for the premier track 
and field events as well as the opening and closing ceremonies, and the heavy use of 
corporate sponsors to finance the Games. The focus on restraining costs resulted in 
total expenditures for the Games of a “mere” $546 million ($1,244 million in 2015 
dollars), less than one-quarter of that spent by Montreal eight years earlier. The 1984 
Los Angeles event managed to become one of the only profitable Games in Olympic 
history, with a final profit of $232.5 million (Walker 2014).
When Los Angeles had shown the possibility of profits from the Games, it led 
multiple cities to enter the bidding process, each hoping to cash in on the potential 
Olympic windfall. However, this crop of new entrants meant that bargaining power 
shifted back to the International Olympic Committee. No longer could cities design 
bids based solely on expected revenues and the expenses necessary to stage the 
event. Instead, applicant cities needed to consider how to beat competing bids from 
other potential hosts. Not only did the competition among cities to host create a 
bidding environment prone to corruption, but it became commonplace for bidders 
to attempt to impress the International Olympic Committee with spectacular new 
architectural monuments like Beijing’s Bird’s Nest or the £269 million London 
Aquatics Centre. The estimated cost of the new, ultra-modern National Olympic 
Stadium in Tokyo, planned as the centerpiece of the 2020 Games, eventually rose to 
$2.02 billion—which for perspective was nearly twice the cost, even after accounting 
for inflation, of the entire 1984 Los Angeles Games—before public outcry led to a 
massive redesign (Ripley and Hume 2015).
Solutions to the Economic Viability Problem
The Olympic Games as currently conducted are not economically viable for 
most cities. The most important reasons include infrastructure costs relating to the 
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venues hosting the events; the monopoly rents that flow to the International Olympic 
Committee; poor management; corruption; and the specter of unreasonable and 
unrealizable economic expectations for the host city and nation. Concerns about costs 
are nothing new. Even Salt Lake City’s $1.9 billion in expenditures in 2002 ($2.5 billion 
in 2015 dollars), which seem almost quaint by today’s standards, raised concerns 
among organizers. Then-President of the International Olympic Committee, Jacques 
Rogge, expressed the “need to streamline costs and scale down the Games so the host 
cities are not limited to wealthy metropolises. … The scale of the Games is a threat 
to their quality,” he said. “In a way, they risk becoming a victim of their own success” 
(as quoted in Roberts 2002).
Costs of staging the Games have skyrocketed in the years since those comments 
were made. The Olympics have reached a tipping point where the majority of 
potential host nations and cities in the industrialized, democratic West have come to 
the realization that hosting is more likely to drain rather than to enhance financial 
resources. Even before Boston and Hamburg’s withdrawals as applicant cities for 
the 2024 Summer Olympic Games, and even before only two applicant cities 
emerged as contenders for the 2022 Winter Olympic Games, the International 
Olympic Committee had been considering major changes to its strategic vision. 
Its Olympic Agenda 2020, which was unanimously passed at the IOC’s 127th Session 
in Monaco in December 2014, included 40 recommendations for reform, many of 
which promoted increased economic sustainability for host cities.
The recommendations provide at least some semblance of solutions to the 
problems relating to the economic viability of the Olympic Games. Specifically, 
they propose to: 1) shape the bidding process as an invitation; 2) evaluate bid cities 
by assessing key opportunities and risks; 3) reduce the cost of bidding; 4) include 
sustainability in all aspects of the Olympic Games; 5) include sustainability within 
the Olympic Movement’s daily operations; and 6) reduce the cost and reinforce the 
flexibility of Olympic Games management (IOC 2014a). In addition, Olympic Agenda 
2020 seeks to reduce corruption by increasing transparency.
Recommendations, of course, must be translated into action. The International 
Olympic Committee has yet to complete a full bidding cycle under their new guide-
lines, but some cities are taking its recommendation seriously. Los Angeles, which 
emerged as the US bid city for 2024 following Boston’s exit, has proposed using 
existing college dormitories at UCLA and the University of Southern California for 
athlete housing during the Games, thus eliminating over $1 billion in costs for an 
athletes’ village from their original plans. Of course, if the IOC again finds itself 
lured into selecting the city with the fanciest accommodations for athletes (and, 
of course, for IOC executives), the most glamorous new stadiums, and the most 
elaborate ceremonies over simpler but more economically rational bids like what 
may be emerging in Los Angeles, then the clear signal will be that it is business as 
usual for the Olympics. Furthermore, blame for such an outcome should not be 
directed solely at the International Olympic Committee. Managing expectations 
is critical. Promising that hosting the Olympics will provide a significant boost to a 
host city and nation’s economy is very likely to result in disappointment. Host cities 
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and nations have to be more proactive, rather than permitting economic interests 
who stand to benefit from the Games to serve as the primary spokespersons for 
economic impact. Officials from national Organizing Committees should do more 
hands-on-management to ensure that the promises of vested interests are reason-
able and achievable.
The problem posed by the extraordinary sports facilities costs can be solved 
through one or a few permanent locations for the Olympic Games. The original 
home of the Olympics in Greece is sometimes proposed. Alternatively, the IOC 
could designate, perhaps, four Summer Olympic and three Winter Olympic venues 
throughout the world that would rotate the staging duties. As yet another alterna-
tive, the IOC might award two successive Games to the same host, so that facilities 
could at least be used twice. Any of these proposals would serve to ensure that 
Olympic sports venues have a useful life of more than just one three-week event.
The fact that Los Angeles profited from the Olympics in 1984 and Barcelona 
experienced an economic revival of sorts as a consequence of hosting the Games in 
1992 has added currency to claims that the Games can be economically transforma-
tive. But hosting the Games has become an increasingly expensive gambit; indeed, 
as the rules for bidding currently stand, the entire structure of the Olympic Games 
shouts “potential host beware.” Issues start with the excesses of the bidding process, 
and are then followed by the construction of expensive and ostentatious sports 
infrastructure and the expensive opening and closing spectacles. If the commercial 
dimension of the Games has become too embedded to eliminate, then the costs 
must be managed better; infrastructure has to be made less expensive and reused; 
host nations and cities have to play the lead role in defining and achieving reason-
able economic outcomes; and corruption has to be targeted through increased 
transparency and broader involvement. The goal should be that the costs of hosting 
are matched by benefits that are shared in a way to include ordinary citizens who 
fund the event through their tax dollars. In the current arrangement, it is often far 
easier for the athletes to achieve gold than it is for the hosts.
■ The authors are thankful to Robert Baumann and Andrew Zimbalist for useful discussions 
in previous projects that have informed much of the analysis here and to Gordon Hanson, 
Enrico Moretti, Ann Norman, and Timothy Taylor for useful comments on earlier drafts. 
Responsibility for interpretation of the data, as well as for any errors, is the authors’ alone.
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